

A Formal Access Control Model for SE-Floodlight Controller

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
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- Software Defined Networks (SDN)
- Floodlight
- SE-Floodlight


- SDN Enabler.






- Basic components
 - Apps (A),
 - Roles (R),
 - Data Exchange Operations (DXOP),
 - Types of DXOPs

- Two types:
 - Local OpenFlow apps
 - Remote OpenFlow apps




- Two main purposes:
 - App permission authorization
 - Flow rule conflict resolution.



Type ID	Type of Data Exchange Operation	Minimum Authorization Role	Open Flow Message Type
t1	Flow removal messages	APP	OFPT_FLOW_REMOVED
t2	Flow error reply	APP	OFPT_ERROR
t3	Echo requests	APP	OFPT_ECHO_REQUEST
t4	Echo replies	APP	OFPT_ECHO_REPLY
t5	Barrier requests	APP	OFPT_BARRIER_REQUEST
t6	Barrier replies	APP	OFPT_BARRIER_REPLY
t7	Switch get config	APP	OFPT_GET_CONFIG_REQUEST
t8	Switch config reply	APP	OFPT_GET_CONFIG_REPLY
t9	Switch stats request	APP	OFPT_STATS_REQUEST
t10	Switch stats report	APP	OFPT_STATS_REPLY
t11	Packet-In return	APP	OFPT_PACKET_IN
t12	Flow rule mod	APP	OFPT_FLOW_MOD
t13	Packet-Out	SEC	OFPT_PACKET_OUT
t14	Vendor actions	ADMIN	OFPT_VENDOR
t15	Vendor features	ADMIN	OFPT_FEATURES
t16	Switch port status	ADMIN	OFPT_PORT_STATUS
t17	Switch port mod	ADMIN	OFPT_PORT_MOD
t18	Switch set config	ADMIN	OFPT_SET_CONFIG

Authentication & Authorization



- Basic Sets and Functions:

A : a finite set of OpenFlow apps.

T : a finite set of types of data exchange operations.

$R = \{ADMIN, SEC, APP\}$: a fixed set of three roles.

$>$: a total order on R where $ADMIN > SEC$ and $SEC > APP$.

$AR \subseteq A \times R$, a many-to-one relation, i.e., $(a, r_1) \in AR \wedge (a, r_2) \in AR \Rightarrow r_1 = r_2$, mapping each app to one role.

$TR \subseteq T \times R$, a many-to-one relation, i.e., $(t, r_1) \in TR \wedge (t, r_2) \in TR \Rightarrow r_1 = r_2$, mapping each operation type to one role.

$DXOP$: a set of possible data exchange operations where each operation $op \in DXOP$ contains a flow rule and a priority if $o = \text{'add flow rule'}$.

$type: DXOP \rightarrow T$, a function specifying the type of each operation. Equivalently viewed as a many-to-one relation $OT \subseteq DXOP \times T$, where $(o, t_1) \in OT \wedge (o, t_2) \in OT \Rightarrow t_1 = t_2$.

- Authorization Rule:

$Authorization_rule: A \times DXOP \rightarrow \{T, F\}$, checks whether $a \in A$ has the right to perform an operation $o \in DXOP$.

$Authorization_rule(a : A, o : DXOP) \equiv (\exists r_1, r_2 \in R. (a, r_1) \in AR \wedge (type(o), r_2) \in TR \wedge r_1 \geq r_2)$.

Formal Authorization Model Definitions **without** Flow Rule Conflict Resolution.

- Basic Sets and Functions:

All basic sets and functions from Table 2.

FR : a set of all possible flow rules where for each $fr_i \in FR$ there should be a priority.

$priority_limit$: $R \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, the mapping of role to the highest priority an app in $r \in R$ may assign to its flow rules, where $priority_limit(ADMIN) > priority_limit(SEC) > priority_limit(APP)$.

S : Set of switches in the network slice.

FT : $S \rightarrow 2^{FR}$, the set of flow rules currently in a switch's flow table.

$rule$: $DXOP \rightarrow FR$, a function that returns the flow rule $fr_c \in FR$ of an operation $op \in DXOP$ given that $type(op) = \text{'Flow Rule Mod'}$.

$priority$: $FR \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, the mapping of a flow rule $fr_c \in FR$ to its priority.

$RCA(fr_c: FR, pr_c: \mathbb{N}, s_t: S) \rightarrow \{Reject, Add, Exchange\}$, a function uses rule-based conflict analysis described in [16] that returns the result of a request to add of new flow rule fr_c into $FT(s_t)$ submitted with priority pr_c . 'Reject', 'Add', or 'Exchange' indicates whether fr_c is rejected, added without removing pre-existing rules, or exchanged with a conflicting flow rule $fr_i \in FT(s_t)$, respectively.

- Authorization Rules:


$Authorization_rule_{op=\text{'add flow rule'}} : A \times S \rightarrow \{T, F\}$, checks whether $a \in A$ has the right to insert a flow rule $rule(op)$ into $FT(s_t \in S)$.

$Authorization_rule_{op=\text{'add flow rule'}} (a : A, s_t: S) \equiv (\exists r_1, r_2 \in R. (a, r_1) \in AR \wedge (type(op), r_2) \in TR \wedge r_1 \geq r_2) \wedge (RCA(rule(op), priority(rule(op)), s_t) \in \{Add, Exchange\})$.


$Authorization_rule_{op \in DXOP - \text{'add flow rule'}} : A \times S \rightarrow \{T, F\}$, checks whether $a \in A$ has the right to perform a non-flow-rule-insertion operation.


$Authorization_rule_{op \in DXOP - \text{'add flow rule'}} (a : A, s_t: S) \equiv (\exists r_1, r_2 \in R. (a, r_1) \in AR \wedge (type(op), r_2) \in TR \wedge r_1 \geq r_2)$

Formal Model Definitions **with** Flow Rule Conflict Resolution.



Example





Function	Condition	Update
$addApp(a)$	$a \notin A$	$A' = A \cup \{a\}$
$deleteApp(a)$	$a \in A \wedge (a,r) \in AR$	$AR' = AR \setminus \{(a,r)\},$ $A' = A \setminus \{a\}$
$addType(t)$	$t \notin T$	$T' = T \cup \{t\}$
$deleteType(t)$	$t \in T \wedge (o,t) \in OT \wedge$ $(t,r) \in TR$	$OT' = OT \setminus \{(o,t) \in OT\},$ $TR' = TR \setminus \{(t,r)\}, T' = T \setminus \{t\}$
$addRole(r)$	$r \notin R$	$R' = R \cup \{r\}$
$deleteRole(r)$	$r \in R \wedge (a,r) \in AR \wedge$ $(t,r) \in TR$	$AR' = AR \setminus \{(a,r) \in AR\},$ $TR' = TR \setminus \{(t,r) \in TR\},$ $R' = R \setminus \{r\}$
$assignApp(a,r)$	$a \in A \wedge r \in R \wedge (a,r) \notin AR$	$AR' = AR \cup \{(r,a)\}$
$revokeApp(a,r)$	$a \in A \wedge r \in R \wedge (a,r) \in AR$	$AR' = AR \setminus \{(a,r)\}$
$assignType(t,r)$	$t \in T \wedge r \in R \wedge (t,r) \notin TR$	$TR' = TR \cup \{(t,r)\}$
$revokeType(t,r)$	$t \in T \wedge r \in R \wedge (t,r) \in TR$	$TR' = TR \setminus \{(t,r)\}$
$assignOp(o,t)$	$o \in DXOP \wedge t \in T \wedge (o,t) \notin OT$	$OT' = OT \cup \{(o,t)\}$
$revokeOp(o,t)$	$o \in DXOP \wedge t \in T \wedge (o,t) \in OT$	$OT' = OT \setminus \{(o,t)\}$

- Five apps

$A = \{LS, LB, NIP, FW, OC\}$,

$R = \{APP, SEC, ADMIN\}$ with a total order $>$ on R , as defined in Table 2,

$T = \{t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4, t_5, t_6, t_7, t_8, t_9, t_{10}, t_{11}, t_{12}, t_{13}, t_{14}, t_{15}, t_{16}, t_{17}, t_{18}\}$, as labled in Table 1,

$AR = \{(LS, APP), (LB, APP), (NIP, SEC), (FW, SEC), (OC, ADMIN)\}$,

$TR = \{(t_i, APP), (t_{13}, SEC), (t_j, ADMIN) | (t_i \in T | 1 \leq i \leq 12, t_j \in T | 14 \leq j \leq 18)\}$,

$DXOP = \{'add flow rule', 'packet in', 'flow stats', 'packet out'\}$,

$Type('add flow rule') = 'Flow rule mod'$, $Type('packet in') = 'Packet - In return'$,

$Type('flow stats') = 'Switch stats request' = 'Switch stats report'$, $Type('packet out') = 'Packet - Out'$,


$AuthorizationRule(LS, 'add flow rule') = true$, $AuthorizationRule(LB, 'add flow rule') = true$,

$AuthorizationRule(FW, 'add flow rule') = true$,

$AuthorizationRule(LS, 'packet in') = true$, $AuthorizationRule(LB, 'packet in') = true$, $AuthorizationRule(NIP, 'packet in') = true$,

$AuthorizationRule(FW, 'packet in') = true$ $AuthorizationRule(OC, 'packet in') = true$,

$AuthorizationRule(LB, 'flow stats') = true$, $AuthorizationRule(FW, 'packet out') = true$.



- A formal authorization model for SDN apps.
 - An administration model.
 - A configuration of the formal model in a use case scenario of five apps.
 - A refined Role hierarchy.
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- Some future goals:
 - Extension of SE-Floodlight access control model to cover all controller resources.
 - An access control model following the NIST RBAC concept.
 - Fine-grained access control using ABAC within a holistic view to SDN resources.

Thank you!
Questions?

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